The Urgenda Case is Separation of Powers at Work

To be published in: N. de Boer, B. M. Aernout Nieuwenhuis en J.-H. Reestman (eds.), Liber Amicorum Besselink (Amsterdam, 2021)

Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2021-39

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2021-05

15 Pages Posted: 9 Dec 2021

See all articles by Christina Eckes

Christina Eckes

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance

Date Written: December 7, 2021

Abstract

Leonard Besselink repeatedly took up the defence of separation of powers in light of the growing powers of the judiciary, resulting principally from two developments: First, international legal instruments increasingly play a role as constitutional sources in determining the validity of national rules; and second, Europeanisation and internationalisation strengthen the grip of the (ordinary) judiciary over the legislature and, as a lesser concern, over the executive. In this short piece, I engage with Leonard Besselink’s arguments, discuss separation of powers in particular in the context of the Urgenda case (Hoge Raad, 2019), and defend the position that the Dutch Supreme Court’s Urgenda ruling is in line with the function of the judiciary. The Urgenda ruling 2019 therefore cannot be criticised for undermining either the specific Dutch conception of separation of powers or more abstract considerations of what separation of powers requires.

Keywords: Separation of Powers, judiciary, public power, Urgenda, democracy

JEL Classification: K4, k41

Suggested Citation

Eckes, Christina, The Urgenda Case is Separation of Powers at Work (December 7, 2021). To be published in: N. de Boer, B. M. Aernout Nieuwenhuis en J.-H. Reestman (eds.), Liber Amicorum Besselink (Amsterdam, 2021), Amsterdam Law School Research Paper No. 2021-39, Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance Research Paper No. 2021-05, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3979729 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3979729

Christina Eckes (Contact Author)

Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance ( email )

Oudemanhuispoort 4-6
1012 CN Amsterdam
Netherlands

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