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The Evolving Nature of EU External Relations Law pp 163–176Cite as

PESCO’s Microcosm of Differentiated Integration

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Abstract

Differentiation, or what some have called the ‘negative starting point’ of integration, has always been the norm in EU defence policy. Political leaders in the European Council are nevertheless mindful of the need to protect their citizens against security threats from within and outside the EU’s borders. For this reason, a package of defensive measures has been developed with remarkable speed since 2016. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) is the most prominent innovation in this field. Somewhat surprisingly, PESCO has produced the most inclusive expression of enhanced cooperation, even if it is the most flexible of the differentiated integration mechanisms provided by the Treaties. This is largely the result of a German push for inclusivity, which prevailed over a French desire for a higher level of ambition. Driven by the European Defence Fund (EDF), PESCO has been touted as the formula to generate ‘positive differentiation’, or greater convergence in Europe’s defence sector. With varied clusters of member states lining up behind different types of projects, this chapter looks at the deeper forms of differentiated integration that are maturing below the Treaty level in EU defence. Is PESCO developing in the way that Germany envisaged or France wanted?

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Notes

  1. 1.

    These can be either complete opt-outs from policy fields or the right to opt-out on a case-by-case basis. Opting in from opt-out areas is also possible, when contractually agreed.

  2. 2.

    De Neve 2007, p. 505.

  3. 3.

    Those countries that would rather not agree to attribute competences to the EU in designated fields.

  4. 4.

    See Schimmelfennig 2018, p. 1158.

  5. 5.

    Blockmans 2013, p. 53.

  6. 6.

    Ibid. The differences in support for CSDP missions were already visible with the adoption by the Council of the CFSP decision to launch EULEX Kosovo, which benefitted from the constructive abstention by Cyprus, and the operationalisation thereof, which also excludes Spain but includes fellow non-recognisers Romania and Slovakia.

  7. 7.

    See Duttle et al. 2007, p. 410.

  8. 8.

    Cf. Council Decision (CFSP) 2018/909 of 25 June 2018 establishing a common set of governance rules for PESCO projects, OJ L161/37, 26 June 2018.

  9. 9.

    See Howorth 2019, p. 261.

  10. 10.

    See Biscop and Coelmont 2011, p. 149.

  11. 11.

    Malta invoked a constitutional commitment to neutrality and non-alignment but kept the door open for future participation depending on the course of implementation of PESCO. See Lazarou and Friede 2018, p. 6.

  12. 12.

    Ibid: “The UK welcomed the launch of PESCO and ‘its ambition to develop military capabilities that address the shortfalls in EU and NATO contexts’, as stated by the British Minister of State for Europe, Alan Duncan, in his answer to the House of Commons.”

  13. 13.

    So far, the general instrument of enhanced cooperation has been triggered only four times. See Council Regulation (EU) 2017/1939 of 12 October 2017 implementing enhanced cooperation on the establishment of the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (“the EPPO”) OJ L283/1, 31 October 2017; Council Decision of 12 July 2010 authorising enhanced cooperation in the areas of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation, OJ L189/12, 22 July 2017; Council Decision of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protection, OJ L76/53, 22 March 2011; and Proposal for a Council Directive implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of financial transaction tax, COM(2013)71 final (currently at a standstill). In all these cases, legislative proposals failed to obtain unanimous support for EU-wide implementation, with individual countries blocking the adoption of secondary legislation and sub-groups of member states forging ahead by way of enhanced cooperation.

  14. 14.

    Council Decision (CFSP) 2017/2315 of 11 December 2017 establishing permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and determining the list of participating Member States, OJ L331/57, 14 December 2017.

  15. 15.

    Prior to PESCO, the most inclusive of enhanced cooperative frameworks was the establishment of the EPPO by 16 member states, joined later by 4 more. See Wolfstädter and Kreilinger 2017.

  16. 16.

    European Council Conclusions, EUCO 34/16, 15 December 2016, para 11.

  17. 17.

    See Blockmans 2018, p. 1785.

  18. 18.

    See Fiott et al. 2017, p. 53.

  19. 19.

    Other factors could be considered, such as the strength of ties as expounded upon by ECFR’s Coalition Explorer. However, this data primarily relies on perceptions.

  20. 20.

    Of note, there are only three projects in which none of the big four is present. These are: Maritime (semi-) Autonomous Systems for Mine Countermeasures (Belgium, Greece, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania), the Joint EU Intelligence School (Greece, Cyprus), and One Deployable Special Operations Force (SOF) Tactical Command and Control (C2) Command Post (CP) for Small Joint Operations (SJO)—(SOCC) for SJO (Greece, Cyprus).

  21. 21.

    These findings are based on original empirical research presented in Blockmans and Macchiarini Crosson 2019.

  22. 22.

    Ibid.

  23. 23.

    See Zandee and Kruijver 2019.

  24. 24.

    German participation in the EI2 could be seen as a way to control the French initiative and prevent it from superseding PESCO as the main experiment in European-wide defence cooperation. Indeed, the potential for duplication, in particular with PESCO’s German-led EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core (EUFOR CROC) project, is real. While stressing the “need to further develop the emergence of a shared strategic culture through the European Intervention Initiative” in their Meseberg Declaration of 19 June 2018, Macron and Chancellor Merkel agreed to link EI2 “as closely as possible with PESCO”. For that to happen though, the associate status of the respective non-members is essential. See https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2018/06/19/meseberg-declaration-renewing-europes-promises-of-security-and-prosperity.en. Accessed 8 July 2020.

  25. 25.

    According to Pannier and Schmitt 2014, and “contrary to the arguments of many discussions, think-tank reports and political actors, there is no evidence that institutionalised cooperation leads to policy convergence as far as defence is concerned.”

  26. 26.

    See Biehl et al. 2013.

  27. 27.

    This is supported by the ‘food-for-thought’ paper encouraging an inclusive vision for third country participation put out by the Benelux countries and supported by Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Portugal, Sweden and Finland. See Blockmans 2017, p. 223.

  28. 28.

    In a joint letter of 13 November 2017 addressed to the HR, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and National Defence of Poland set out three conditions for Poland’s participation in PESCO: primacy of NATO’s defence planning process; competitive, innovative and balanced development of the European defence industry in order to suit the needs of all the member states involved; and a “360-degree approach” to security threats with particular attention paid to the eastern flank. See Consilium Europa 2017.

  29. 29.

    See, e.g., several of the contributions in European Defence Agency 2018.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. CEPS, Brussels, Belgium

    S. Blockmans

  2. University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    S. Blockmans

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  1. S. Blockmans
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Correspondence to S. Blockmans .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. EU Legal—Centre for European and International Law, The Hague, The Netherlands

    W. Th. Douma

  2. Amsterdam Centre for European Law and Governance, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    C. Eckes

  3. Ghent European Law Institute (GELI), Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium

    P. Van Elsuwege

  4. T.M.C. Asser Institute, The Hague, The Netherlands

    E. Kassoti

  5. Faculty of Law, Maastricht University, Maastricht, The Netherlands

    A. Ott

  6. Faculty of Law, Groningen University, Groningen, The Netherlands

    R. A. Wessel

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Blockmans, S. (2021). PESCO’s Microcosm of Differentiated Integration. In: Douma, W.T., Eckes, C., Van Elsuwege, P., Kassoti, E., Ott, A., Wessel, R.A. (eds) The Evolving Nature of EU External Relations Law. T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-423-5_7

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-423-5_7

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  • Publisher Name: T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague

  • Print ISBN: 978-94-6265-422-8

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